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The philosophical presupposition of this thesis is a simple one:  humans are inextricably 
part of the universe. This may seem obvious; in its application, however, it requires a radical 
shift in outlook. Anthropology has long recognized and embraced the idea that humans are 
biocultural beings, but if humans are inextricably part of the universe, then they are acted on and 
shaped by universal forces. Understanding human nature requires not just understanding 
ourselves vis-à-vis other primates, or even vis-à-vis other animals, but understanding ourselves 
vis-à-vis entropy and atoms, biochemistry and black holes. At first, it may seem absurd to think 
that black holes or quantum mechanics might tell us anything about human nature, but it is 
important to remember that the basic components that make a black hole, a galaxy or a pocket-
watch are the same things from which we are made – quarks and atoms, elements and waves. As 
Carl Sagan (1990) elegantly put it, we are all made of star-stuff.   
Our current understanding of the nature of the universe is approximately as follows: the 
universe is entirely made up of energy that, in turn, is doled out and divided into various forms 
following set rules. At the most basic level of this energy distribution system are particles and 
fields. Particles, which are the components of matter, have energy in the form of mass and 
momentum and may have other types of energies including charge and color. Fields are the 
background energy surface on which particles move and interact. Importantly, everything in the 
universe that is real has in its constituent components a specific organization of particles. The 
universe, through various mechanisms, is taking a continuous distribution of energy and dividing 
it into discrete and quantifiable parts. 
In turn, these elementary particles can organize into larger structures. Quarks become 
protons and neutrons that combine with electrons to form atoms. Each elemental atom is made 
up of a unique configuration of elementary particles - a given number of protons, neutrons and 
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electrons, which confer upon the atom special properties that none of its constituent parts possess 
on their own. An atom can interact with other particles and universal fields in a way that a 
proton, a quark, or an electron cannot. Atoms too can organize, binding together through a 
sharing of electrons or through field-interactions, to form molecules.  
Surprisingly, molecules of our universe too can join and interact dynamically to produce 
self-sustaining reactions and, ultimately, life. On a world-wide scale, the metabolism of life, 
which produces the necessary energy for all biological actions, is a carefully controlled series of 
molecular interactions that converts elementary particles – photons – into usable and productive 
energy. All life is the result of a complex and dense interaction of molecular interactions, and, in 
turn, has properties that no molecule on its own exhibits. Life evolves. Through natural selection 
and other evolutionary forces, life has diversified into a myriad of forms and functionalities. By 
concentrating and directing molecular interactions, life can interact with the universe in new 
ways not available to singular molecules.   
At this point the reader may be wondering what, if anything, this has to do with 
anthropology.  The answer, at least the answer I am advocating, is that culture and consciousness 
are the next steps in this organizational story. Culture arises from a specific interaction generated 
by biological life and, in turn, allows new interactions with the biosphere and the universe. While 
anthropology has long explored how culture shapes individuals and mediates their interactions 
with the world, there has been no scholarship, at least of which I am aware, that has seriously 
attempted to place culture as a physical entity and to locate its boundaries in the universe. To 
locate culture in such a way, it will be necessary to briefly return to the larger organizational 
story.  
4 
 
The overarching organization pattern of the universe is the joining of discrete entities 
which produces outsized, and often a prioi unpredictable, effects. In a sense, the universe is a 
dynamic system writ large, with multiple organizational levels and emergent properties.  
Elementary particles become atoms which become molecules which become life. Importantly, 
too, a small number of discrete components can give rise to a huge number of possible 
combinations. There are only twenty four elementary particles, and fewer than 120 elemental 
atoms which make up the known universe. On the biological level, life is ultimately produced 
from a varying sequence of only four distinct nucleotides and some twenty two amino acids. 
Each level produces a new interaction entity, which in turn gives rise to the organizational 
structures on that level. These new interaction entities, in turn, might be described as the most 
fundamental unit of that organizational level, since reducing any of them further would destroy 
their unique interactional properties. Information theory (Shannon, 1949) provides us with a term 
for the most fundamental unit of organization – the bit. In a rough sense, then, we might think of 
particles as the bit of physics, atoms as the bit of chemistry, and DNA and genes, as the bit of 
biology.  
In this thesis I propose that there is also a bit for culture, a biocultural juncture where the 
metabolic processes of life organize in such a way as to create a new interaction sphere — 
culture. While the exact mechanisms for how the universe creates this cultural organization are 
heretofore unknown, recent advances in neuroscience provide a starting point for this 
investigation. Specifically, research regarding the neural code (Nestor, Plaut, and Behrmann, 
2011; Lisman and Jensen, 2013; Stanley, 2013; Shamir, 2014) provides a preliminary 
understanding of neuronal processing and synaptic firing in the brain that is roughly analogous to 
the genetic code.  In this neural code interpretation of the brain, neurons respond in an organized 
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and predictable fashion to their environment leading to behaviors and bodily actions generated 
by repeatable and predictable neuronal interactions. Leading from this, ideas and patterns of 
thought could be encoded by specific neuronal firing patterns, and as a result, culture could 
ultimately be described in terms of underlying neuronal activity.  
Specifically, what my culture-as-bit hypothesis proposes, based on current 
understandings of neuroscience and the neural code, is that every individual thought, behavior or 
belief is the result of a unique firing and neurotransmitter release pattern of the neurons. 
Ontogenic learning of ideas and thoughts, in turn, are the result of the brain training itself to 
reliably produce and enact specific neuronal firing patterns, similar to how a baby must learn to 
move its appendages (Thelen, 1985; Thelen, 1987; Hadders-Algra, 2002; Thalen and Corbetta, 
2009) or how an injured person must retrain their muscles to walk (Sheppard, 2001; Fouad and 
Pearson, 2004; Pearse, et al., 2004).  For the individual this is a more or less an open process, 
with neural plasticity, dendritic reshaping, and non-linear firing action allowing for continual 
change over the course of a lifetime. Furthermore, while there are a relatively limited number of 
organization entities at other universal levels (twenty four elementary particles, four nucleotides, 
and so on), the adult human brain contains some eighty six billion neurons, each interlinked by 
up to 7000 synaptic connections allowing for an essentially infinite range of permutations 
(Pakkenberg, et al., 2003; Herculano-Houzel, 2009), easily allowing for the entire range of 
possible thoughts. Every culture-bit is a specific sequenced firing of neurons across the variable 
neural network that composes the brain.  
The culture-as-bit hypothesis is, primarily, a physical interpretation of what culture 
actually exists as in the world and universe. Thinking about culture in terms of discrete bits can 
grant new and important implications for how anthropologists view social organization, cultural 
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evolution, and human evolution, which I will explore later in this thesis. In the rest of the 
introduction I place this idea of culture as bit-like in the context of previous anthropological 
scholarship to illustrate that while the approach and viewpoints are unique, they do not deviate in 
spirit from previous anthropological works. Importantly, as far as anthropologists are concerned, 
this hypothesis of culture-as-bit does not alter anthropological findings of how culture builds and 
organizes itself, except where anthropological literature conflicts with whatever is found to be 
true regarding the universe or neuroscience, since this proposal necessitates consistency with 
larger structures of scientific thought.  In content, the idea of culture as bit-like is most closely 
related to the ideas of Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908-2009) and Structuralist traditions while in its 
approach it resembles Leslie White’s (1900-1975) attempts to find universal laws of culture. I 
will also attempt to demonstrate that viewing culture as bit-like need not overturn previous 
anthropological findings by arguing that bit-like culture is at least not inconsistent with, and 
perhaps supports, two major anthropological frameworks – Clifford Geertz’s (1926-2006) 
symbolically-mediated thick description and Sherry Ortner’s (1941-) practice theory. 
 Few anthropologists have had as large a theoretical impact as Lévi-Strauss, who began 
his fieldwork in 1935 and continued working up until his death in 2009, just short of his 101
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birthday. Along with Roman Jakobson (1896-1982) and Edmund Leach (1910-1989), Lévi-
Strauss developed the theoretical school of structuralism. In a series of highly cited works, 
including The Raw and the Cooked (1964), The Savage Mind (1966) and Structural 
Anthropology (1973), Lévi-Strauss articulated a cohesive view of human culture and thinking. In 
Lévi-Strauss’s model the human mind is universally the same in its construction across all 
human populations and is driven by a deep grammar or set of rules that predispose it to binary 
interpretations of the world. Culture, in turn, serves as a mediating agent that seeks to resolve 
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these binaries and produce unity. Finally, human social organization is driven by the underlying 
grammatical rules of the brain working subconsciously.  
While structuralism covers a huge range of anthropological thought, there are several 
elements in Lévi-Strauss’s thinking that align with or resemble the proposal of culture-as-bit. 
First and most obviously, the culture-as-bit hypothesis also views culture, and human 
interpretations’ of the world, as fundamental results of human cognitive action and arrangement. 
Of course, there are important differences.  For instance, I see no reason to presume that human 
brains are predisposed to binary division, as opposed to capably managing multiple, distinct 
interpretations, but this difference can largely be explained by the cognitive models with which 
Lévi-Strauss had to work. There is another, more nuanced, similarity between structuralism and 
culture-as-bit. In his analyses of myth, Lévi-Strauss defined the basic unit of analysis of myth as 
the “mytheme.” For Lévi-Strauss, mythemes are constituent units of myths and are bundled 
together in a set of relations to produce the meaning of the myth (Lévi-Strauss, 1955). While 
there appears to be an immediate analogous relationship between mythemes and the proposal of 
culture-as-bit, it is important to understand that Lévi-Strauss derived his mytheme approach from 
Saussurean grammar, while culture-as-bit comes from a consideration of the organizational 
structure of the universe. What is actually shared between the two is not necessarily that the 
human mind is inherently grammatical, but rather an understanding that apparently continuous 
and organizationally complex entities, respectively myth and culture, can be fully described by 
discrete parts and their relationships.  
In a more general sense, what is shared between the proposal of culture-as-bit and 
structuralism is the notion that human culture and organization are a direct product of human 
cognitive function. Furthermore, that human culture itself is ultimately describable in terms of its 
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constituent parts and their interrelationships. The concepts differ dramatically, however, in their 
specific interpretations of human cognitive function and its impact on the development of 
culture. Lévi-Strauss’s insistence that all cognitive functions follow the same rules as grammar 
seems shallow compared to what we now know to be true regarding human neuroscience, while 
culture-as-bit is fully interpretable with innate variation in human thought, neural plasticity, and 
environmental effectors.  Unlike structuralism, culture-as-bit recognizes, to paraphrase Whitman, 
that humans can contain multitudes.  
 If the culture-as-bit model most closely resembles Lévi-Strauss’s ideas in regards to 
content, in its general approach it is comparable to Leslie White’s attempt to find universal laws 
of culture. In his two most prominent treatments of culture, The Science of Culture: A Study of 
Man and Civilization (1949) and The Evolution of Culture: The Development of Civilization to 
the Fall of Rome (1959), White outlines his view that culture is a unique phenomenon, 
describable only in its own terms and that over the course of time, culture can evolve in its 
capacities and abilities. He developed what has become known as White’s Law, an argument that 
the total sum of cultural development is equal to total energy used for work on a per capita basis. 
The differences between White’s conception of culture and culture-as-bit are numerous. Perhaps 
the most significant is that the culture-as-bit hypothesis need not see culture as purely 
determining human behavior, nor does culture-as-bit see culture as autonomously evolving 
without respect to human action.  Nevertheless, White’s general approach to the problem of 
culture and cultural evolution closely resemble the ones followed here.  
In White’s conception of culture’s nature and evolution (White, 1943; Barrett, 1989), 
culture acts as an organization of energy utilized by humans to fulfill their needs. Similarly to the 
culture-as-bit hypothesis, White places culture on a universal scale, in his case by relating the 
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level of cultural advancement to the energy expenditure and capture of a given society. In doing 
so, White relies on carefully reasoned relational models, reducing observed phenomena to a few 
general variables, placing them in relation to one another and justifying this placement through 
inductive reasoning from the empirical evidence. He is also quite honest about the shortcuts or 
eliminations he must make. For example, in developing White’s Law he states “since the 
overwhelming portion of a cultural development is due to technological progress, we may 
legitimately ignore that small portion which is not so dependent by regarding it as a constant”  
(White, 1943, pg 336.). White privileges technological progress based on his assessment of 
available ethnographic evidence to make the resulting equation easier to work with by having 
fewer terms contained within it.    
This approach of modeling is the one followed in the thesis, but in an expanded context. 
White’s failures, in my view, have less to do with the power of his ideas than the limitations of 
math and knowledge at his time. White was particularly leery of looking to other fields for the 
development of his ideas, explicitly stating that “the culturologist knows more about cultural 
evolution than the biologist, even today, knows about biological evolution,”  (White, 1943, pg 
339). While I might differ with the truth-value of White’s statement, it is true that at the time 
biology was only beginning to undergo what would be known as the “modern evolutionary 
synthesis” (Huxely, 1942; Mayr, 1942; Simpson, 1944; Stebbins, 1950) and it is certainly true 
that biological evolutionary theory has grown manifold since White’s time.1 As such, this thesis, 
and the culture-as-bit hypothesis, sees no aversion to drawing on biology and biological models. 
In fact this is probably necessary. In an inversion of White’s beliefs, today’s modern biology 
probably knows more about biological evolution than anthropologists know about cultural 
evolution.  
                                                 
1
 There is, of course, some meta-irony in this that I would just like to highlight.  
10 
 
Finally, since I recognize too that anthropological theory has grown since the time of 
Lévi-Strauss and White, I would like to outline how culture-as-bit is at least not inconsistent with 
more modern theories before beginning the thesis proper. The two major theories to be addressed 
will be Geertz’s symbolically mediated thick description and Ortner’s practice theory.  
Clifford Geertz (1926-2006) wrote extensively across anthropological subject areas, from 
field work (Geertz, 1960; Geertz, 1963, Geertz, 1968) to cultural theory (Geertz, 1973; Geertz, 
1983) to methodology and the role of the anthropologist (Geertz, 1988; Geertz, 2001). Through 
these works, Geertz developed his central ideas – that culture is an interconnected set of symbols 
and it is through these symbols that humans come to understand and mediate their world. In 
Geertz’s view, it is the job of the anthropologist to uncover the meaning of these symbols as 
understood by those who experience them and accurately describe these meanings to an outsider.  
The culture-as-bit hypothesis is not inconsistent with Geertz’s interpretation of culture or 
his views on anthropological goals. Under the culture-as-bit hypothesis, a symbol is simply a 
consistently and commonly held thought-pattern or understanding of the world. While the 
foundation of the culture-as-bit hypothesis is neuroscience and the physical universe, it does not 
by any means insist that all generated ideas need be useful, utilitarian or directly interpretive of 
the world for those who generate them. Empirical evidence, as gathered by Geertz, as well as 
many other anthropologists, amply shows that there is a broad diversity in how differing 
populations can come to understand their world (e.g. Turner, 1970; Bateson, 1972; Crocker, 
1990; Shostak, 2000). Under the culture-as-bit hypothesis, each of these differing populations is 
a large set of  individuals that have simply developed and sustained unique thought patterns that, 
in theory, could be physically interpretable and describable if given sufficient data. Given, 
however, the current limitations of neuroscience, and the ethical problems such a physical 
11 
 
analysis might entail, Geertz’s semiotic thick description is a way of deducing these differences 
from behavioral observation.      
In Sherry Ortner’s (1941 – present) analyses, the traditional framework of culture is 
eschewed in favor of seeing humans interacting in a dynamic tension of roles, understandings 
and embodiments. Based on field work with the Sherpa in Nepal (Ortner, 1978; Ortner, 1989; 
Ortner, 1999) and, more recently, in the United States (Ortner, 2003), Ortner seeks to understand 
individuals’ roles and their understanding of their world through the lens of what she terms 
“serious games,” an extension of Bourdieu’s practice theory (1977). Serious games “are not just 
bundles of intentions or fields of language discourse [but] involve players, differentially 
positioned, differentially situated, with respect to those intentions and those discourses,” (Ortner, 
1999, pg. 150). For Ortner, what matters is that every person is in a state of constant evaluation, 
action and flux in their position socially and in relation to the larger world structures. The job of 
the anthropologist becomes to uncover the dynamics and nature of these interactions at the level 
of the individual and the level of the society.  
Where culture-as-bit might come in is in providing a physical interpretation of this 
process. The fields of discourse and intentions proposed by practice theory are merely the by-
product of consistent or commonly held belief and thought-structures across multiple individuals 
while evaluation and agency actions are the product of more relatively transient thought 
processes at the level of the individual. Again, it is probably not of great utility for practice 
theorists, as of yet, to think of culture in terms of discrete ideas and culture-bits because the 
questions they ask and the level of interaction and organization they are dealing with are much 
larger.  
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What might be clear at this point is that this thesis is not a work of traditional 
anthropology. There is no single tradition – structural functionalism, practice theory, etc. – into 
which the views and arguments I express can be readily placed, unless one might consider the 
small group of mathematical anthropologists a tradition. Nevertheless, my interests – culture, 
cultural evolution, and human evolution – are distinctly anthropological.  While I will draw on 
many other disciplines in the course of the thesis, my hope in doing so is that the field of 
anthropology can be moved forward, even if only slightly. 
 In terms of the structure of this thesis, the arguments presented here are exclusively 
methodological and theoretical, relying on analysis and synthesis of other scholarship.  Together 
they advocate for re-grounding the discussion of culture in a firm understanding of the 
biological, physical, and mathematical and that this re-grounding will yield new insights into and 
understandings of human nature and culture. The first chapter will advance the use of 
mathematical graph theory for better understanding human social structure and its role as a 
storage-unit of culture. The second chapter derives a potential mathematical approach for 
studying cultural evolution and the spread of culture through populations that allows for a union 
of two previous lines of anthropological analysis. The final chapter combines the findings of the 
two previous into a cohesive argument regarding human evolution.  
Chapter 1 
 Human beings on large population scales exhibit a particular social organization that is 
strongly associated with the ability to maintain and preserve connectivity and information in the 
face of attack (Liljeros, et al., 2001; Song, Havlin and Makse, 2005). In this chapter I will argue 
that this observed social organization is not a coincidence and likely evolved in order to act as a 
storehouse for the preservation and maintenance of culture in the face of strong environmental 
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pressures. In order to make this argument it will first be necessary to briefly discuss 
mathematical graph theory.  
 Graph theory is a subfield of mathematics interested in understanding discrete points in 
space and their interrelationships. The mathematical study of graphs has been progressing for 
almost 300 years (Euler, 1741), and a large set of mathematical proofs, theorems and 
understandings has been constructed to understand various graphs and their features.  In 
mathematics, the points of graphs are termed vertices and the connections between these points 
are termed edges, with the set of vertices and edges together forming the graph. When the 
vertices and edges have real-world interpretations, however, a different terminology set is used 
consisting of nodes and links, respectively, which form a network. This notation of nodes, links, 
and networks will be used in this chapter.  
 The first to introduce mathematical graph theory to anthropology was the pair of Per 
Hage and Frank Harary (Hage and Harary, 1984; Jenkins, 2008). In their applications, individual 
humans formed the node of the networks and the social connections between the individuals 
formed the links. Hage and Harary utilized graph theory across a wide variety of anthropological 
areas, including the wealth structure of the kula ring (Hage, Harary and James, 1986), New 
Guinean sexual-duality beliefs (Hage and Harary, 1981; Hage and Harary, 1983) and 
mathematical structures of kin systems (Hage and Harary, 1995; Hage and Harary, 1996).  
   More recently, graph theory and networks have been used to study a variety of real-world 
phenomena including human social organization (Liljeros, et al., 2001; Barabási, et al., 2002; 
Ebel, Mielsch and Bornholdt, 2002; Guimera, et al., 2003; Song, Havlin and Makse, 2005; 
Barabási, 2009).  These studies collectively found that at large population numbers, i.e. a few 
thousand or more, human interactions collectively form what has been termed a scale-free 
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network. In such scale-free networks, social connections between humans follow a specific 
mathematical pattern
2
, which creates a unique network structure. This scale-free network 
structure is shown in Figure 1, opposite a random network. The connections between nodes in 
the random network are determined purely by change, while in the scale-free network clusters of 
connections emerge around hub nodes.  
Figure 1. Scale-free versus Random Network 
 
The scale-free network on the right contains many more clusters and hubs than the random network on the left. 
Given these recent findings of human scale-free network structures, and similar structures 
in other biological contexts, the properties of scale-free networks are currently being studied in 
mathematics. One of the most important findings is that scale-free networks are highly resistant 
to attack (Albert, et al., 2000; Cohen, et al., 2000; Callaway, et al., 2000; Cohen, et al., 2001),  
meaning that even when nodes are removed from the network a continuous scale-free structure is 
maintained for long periods. The network does not easily fragment into smaller, separate 
networks. Additionally, scale-free networks often exhibit another feature termed  small-world 
                                                 
2
 Mathematically, this relation is  ( )    . 
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phenomenon (Amaral, et al., 2000; Cohen and Havlin, 2003; Wang and Chen, 2003; van Noort, 
et al, 2004). Within networks exhibiting the small-world phenomenon, the path between any two 
nodes in the network is relatively short, even for networks with large node sizes. It is relatively 
easy to connect two nodes via a small number of links no matter the number of nodes. To 
understand this better, it might help to consider the parlor games that have developed around this 
small-world phenomenon exhibited in human networks  - trying to connect an actor/actress to 
Kevin Bacon in fewer than six relationships is one such example. A similar game has developed 
in academia, in determining how many sets of shared publishing credits is needed to link a 
scholar with the prolific mathematician Paul Erdös.
3
 The combination of robustness to attack and 
small-world phenomenon provides scale-free networks with unique features not seen in other 
network structures.  
With both of these features in mind, it is possible construct an argument for why humans 
may have preferentially evolved scale-free network structures. Under the culture-as-bit proposal 
ideas and cultural creations are contained in the minds of individuals and generated through 
specific neuronal interactions. Furthermore, each node of the network represents a single 
individual. It would be possible, then, to map the entire culture of the population as a network 
with each nodal person having the ideas and cultural creations specific to itself. The distribution 
of these culture-bits would roughly follow the knowledge and experience distributions of the 
network, so that one would expect, for instance, those who hunted to have more culture-bits 
related to hunting while those who practiced medicine would have more culture-bits related to 
medicine and healing. The connections of this network would again represent the social 
connections between individuals. These social connections would act as the major avenues via 
                                                 
3
 There is a small group of people who possess both Bacon and Erdös numbers, including most prominently Carl 
Sagan, Richard Feynman, Natalie Portman, and Noam Chomsky.  
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which any given culture-bits are transmitted (this will be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter).    
 Under this system the network and its nodes are acting as a storage mechanism for the 
individual culture-bits with each nodal-person containing some number, but not all, of the total 
culture-bits in the network. We can hypothesize that the total number of persons in the network 
would correspond to the overall number of culture-bits observed. In fact, this is what has been 
found in empirical settings. In Oceania, anthropologists Michelle Kline and Robert Boyd (2010) 
illustrated that local population network size correlated well with the complexity of fishing 
technology at the time of European contact. Similarly, Joseph Heinrich (2004) has proposed that 
differences in technological complexity between native Tasmanians and Australians can be 
explained by the reduction in effective population size in Tasmania when the island split from 
the continent. Together, these examples provide evidence for social organization structures 
acting as a storehouse of culture-bits.  
 If human social networks are serving as a storehouse for culture-bits it would make sense 
for the storehouse to be designed in a way to minimize loss over time. As has already been 
discussed, scale-free networks are highly resistant to external pressures and the exhibited small-
world phenomenon would make it relatively easy to transmit culture-bits across even large 
networks. The scale-free network structure, then, likely arose via natural selection as a way of 
combating external environmental pressures that might sever connections and reduce 
connectivity in the network. The importance would be greatest when environmental pressures are 
extremely intense, for instance in epidemic disease or population bottlenecks, where maintaining 
connectivity is critical to surviving the event.  
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 Obviously, this argument of social organization acting as a storehouse for culture-bits is 
only a preliminary hypothesis and much research will be needed to test it. Several areas seem 
like opportune testing grounds. First, it might be expected that populations which have more 
intense environmental pressures might exhibit more scale-free structures, while those 
populations that face less severe environmental pressures might exhibit other network structure 
types. Correlated to this, it is likely that alternate network structures arise to serve different needs 
related to the propagation, production or maintenance of culture-bits. Universities, for instance, 
tend to concentrate nodal persons with large numbers of culture-bits all in a tight network 
structure, which has been variously tied to greater knowledge production (Godin and Gingras, 
2000; Griffiths, 2004; Lambooy, 2004). Another important area needing study, and for which 
anthropologists are particularly suited, is that humans can move through social networks over 
time as they add new social connections and old ones are removed through falling out or death, a 
fact which is recently being examined in the mathematical literature (Gozalez, et al., 2008; 
Wang, et al., 2011). What motivates these movements, however, and whether these movements 
follow any predictable rules, is unclear. Additionally, how these movements might impact the 
culture-bit distribution of the network is also unclear. 
In summary, the argument of this chapter is that human social organization acts as a 
storehouse for the culture-bits of individuals.  Scale-free structure may have arisen to minimize 
connectivity loss in the face of environmental pressures. Alternate environmental conditions, 
however, might result in differing network structures. More study will be needed to rigorously 
test the expected outcomes of the proposal across a variety of settings.  
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Chapter 2 
 While the previous chapter examined broad-level social organization and how the 
structure of such organization affects the storage of culture-bits, this chapter addresses the topic 
of cultural evolution. I will illustrate how thinking in terms of culture-bits can allow for a union 
of both specific cultural ontogenies and large-scale models of cultural evolution.  
 Anthropologists have long been interested in how culture propagates, transmits and 
evolves through time. The study of these questions has taken form in two broad areas of analysis: 
the process of transmission and modeling large-scale transmission and cultural evolution. 
Process-oriented culture studies focus on individual ontogenies and how individuals come to 
learn the beliefs, knowledge, and skills they possess. Margaret Mead’s (1901-1978) Coming of 
Age in Samoa (1928) was the first published work extensive treat the topic based on rigorous 
field-work, and since then the subject has been examined in  a number of populations and 
geographic areas (e.g. Turner, 1970;  Bateson, 1972; Crocker, 1990; Shostak, 2000). More 
detailed studies have used particular subject areas of cultural knowledge, such as hunting skills 
(Borre, 1991; Hill and Kintigh, 2009; MacDonald, 2010) to determine what factors influence and 
mold individuals’ knowledge acquisition in specific knowledge domains. Other studies focused 
on the ontogenetic learning differences between humans and non-human primates (Call, 
Carpenter and Tomasello, 2005; Matsuzawa, Tomonaga, and Tanaka, 2006; Tomasello and 
Carpenter, 2006; Buttelmann, et al., 2013). The purpose of such works is to determine, at the 
level of the individual, how a person acquires cultural knowledge and abilities. The culture-as-bit 
proposal does not yet have much to directly offer this interest in individual learning processes, 
other than to comment that these processes, at some level, must be contained in the 
neurochemistry of the individual.  
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The culture-as-bit hypothesis contributes mainly in the second area:  large-scale models 
of transmission and cultural evolution. Typically, in large-scale models of transmission and 
cultural evolution, differences in individual ontogenies are collapsed and it is assumed that 
culture can be more or less freely transmitted among individuals. From there, a general model of 
how cultures as a whole differentiate and evolve is constructed based on various constraints and 
assumptions. The earliest debates regarding these large-scale models focused on whether cultures 
evolved unilineally (Tylor, 1881), multilinearly (Steward, 1972; Lewis, 2001) or through some 
diffusionary process (Kroeber, 1952). More recently, the debate has focused on whether culture 
is transmitted primarily horizontally or vertically and how much cultural evolution resembles 
biological evolution (Mulder, et al., 2006; Collard, Shennan, and Tehrani, 2006; Lycett, 2009; 
Ellen, Lycett and Johns, 2013).   
The culture-as-bit hypothesis can offer a way of reconciling the two levels of analysis to 
incorporate individual ontogenies into models of cultural evolution. This can be done by 
examining the transmission of culture-bits at the level of the population network. The hypothesis 
can also provide a reasonable explanation for the differences in cultural and biological evolution. 
This necessitates, however, applying the arguments of the last chapter to the topic of cultural 
transmission. Here, it will be assumed that individual humans form a network of connections, 
that the social bonds between them form the links of this network, and that each nodal-person 
contains some number of individual culture-bits. Additionally, it will be assumed that cultural 
evolution occurs when the distribution of culture-bits across the network changes, which can 
occur from selection, drift, mutation or some other force. This definition of evolution is the 
classic one provided by early mathematical analyses of genetics at the turn of the 20
th
 century, 
which illustrated that in absence of any evolutionary force, the distribution of alleles in a 
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population would remain constant (Castle, 1903; Pearson, 1903; Weinberg, 1908; Hardy, 1908). 
The population in the context of culture is the network, and alleles are the culture-bits held by 
nodal-persons.   
Additionally, this chapter will assume two types of evolutionary forces: internal and 
external. Internal forces are specific to a species or population and are defined as those forces 
which would, even when external forces are held constant, continue to produce evolution up until 
the point of Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. These internal forces include but are not limited to: 
genetic drift, sexual selection, social organization and dynamics, and mutation. The forces of 
social organization would include many classic areas of anthropologic study including kin 
structure, political organization, colonial structures and ideology. External forces are global 
variables defined as those that produce evolution only so long as they are changing and include, 
non-exhaustively, predation, temperature, geography, and environmental resources.
4
   
To explore the differences between cultural and biological evolution and how individual 
ontogenies of cultural learning can relate to cultural evolution models, let us conduct a thought-
experiment. First, we might combine all the forces of evolution, both internal and external, into a 
single value, transmission cost, which measures how difficult it is to pass on genes or transmit 
culture-bits. More explicitly, the transmission cost would be the solution to a partial differential 
equation that contained all the possible causes of evolution. Transmission cost, in turn, could be 
related to the frequency of a given allele or culture-bit in the population such that when 
transmission cost is low, the frequency should approach fixation, and when transmission cost is 
high the frequency should approach extinction. The first derivative of this function solves for the 
                                                 
4
 For those so inclined, it may be useful to loosely think in terms of a statistical mechanics problem in which the 
external forces are thermodynamic parameters of the system and the internal forces are the mechanisms by which 
the system cycles through microstates to find the free-energy minimum (Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium) relative to 
these parameters.  
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evolution, or rate of change in frequency, of the allele or culture-bit in the population.  A  generic 
equation depicting this change in allele or culture-bit frequency as a function of transmission 
cost, and its resulting corrected first derivative (the evolution function), is shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. Trait frequency and evolution as a function of transmission cost. 
 
 
The integrated area of allele or culture-bit frequency as a function of transmission cost 
represents all possible states of the system: every possible combination of evolutionary pressures 
and the resulting frequencies. It is at this level that we can begin to discern the differences 
between cultural evolution and biological evolution, as well as incorporate ethnographically 
observed ontogenies. Specifically, the ethnographic ontogenies form part of the differential 
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equation determining transmission cost, which in turn collapses or expands the range of possible 
transmission cost values. For example, the fact that agricultural knowledge is mainly learned 
during the growing season could be incorporated into the transmission cost equation for the 
culture-bits related to agriculture. As another example, the rule that only men are able to learn 
the shamanic language would be incorporated into the transmission cost equation related to 
culture-bits for shamanic rituals and language. The end result is that cultural evolution for the 
population comes from the enacted sum of all the culture-bit equations. Each equation gives the 
distribution of a single culture-bit while all the equations together produce the cultural evolution 
of the system.  
In biological systems, the external forces of natural selection act through predation and 
other environmental pressures. Similar external forces also act on cultural networks at the level 
of node-persons in that nodes can be removed by way of death or impairment by some 
environmental force. Internal forces in biological systems are, in turn, demonstrated by the 
inability to find a random viable mate in biological systems. In cultural systems, the internal 
forces are the direct result of ethnographic ontogenies in that ontogenies determine the difficulty 
in transmitting or spreading a given culture-bit. Cultural and biological evolutionary systems 
diverge, then, from the differing inputs of external and internal forces into the transmission cost 
differential equation.  
For instance, in biological systems, changes in allele frequency due to reproduction 
come, tautologically, from the ability to find a willing and viable mate. In most biological 
systems, this ability is limited by a conditional probability in mating. That is, the ability to 
reproduce is capped by the number of viable females in the population. The fact that a female 
can only successfully mate a set number of times per generation cycle limits the potential change 
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in allele frequency in the population.
5
 This in turn is factored into the transmission cost equation 
for that system. This limits the range of allele frequencies by capping the potential set resulting 
from genetic drift or other internal forces. For example, a single male with a rare mutation cannot 
pass this on to the majority of the offspring population because he is competing against other 
males for mates.  Females are similarly limited by the upper limit on offspring they can 
successfully carry to term. Cultural systems however, are not necessarily capped by this 
limitation and, as such, can have a significantly larger range of culture-bit frequencies that come 
from drift.  In this case, the lack of conditional probabilities in mating allows for a greater range 
of evolution in cultural systems. This example difference between cultural evolution systems and 
biological systems is depicted in Figure 3.  
Figure 3.  Evolution in generic biological system versus cultural system as a function of 
transmission cost. 
 
                                                 
5
 More accurately, the presence of superfetation and heteropaternal superfecundation in many species means that it 
is not truly the number of females that matter but something closer to the “uterine space,” or the maximal offspring 
possible.   
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To put this more intuitively, cultural systems and biological systems differ in their 
evolution in that each has different evolutionary variables and forces acting on them. This is not 
to say that biological evolution cannot reasonably approximate cultural evolution. Where cultural 
ontogenic rules resemble the rules governing biological evolution, the resulting frequency 
change equations will appear similar. For instance, knowledge that is primarily passed 
matrilineally might be expected to closely resemble models of biological evolution (Tehrani and 
Collard, 2002; Tehrani and Collard, 2009), since the culture-bits are only passed on to kin 
relations similar to genes. Similarly, when a culture-bit is already saturated across the population, 
it may become hard to find a person who does not already possess the bit. In this case, a term 
similar to the conditional probability of biological systems would come into play and limit the 
transmission cost range resulting in an evolutionary path similar to that of a biological system. 
To summarize briefly, the culture-as-bit hypothesis and the arguments from the previous 
chapter offer a theoretical basis for synthesizing individual ethnographically-observed learning 
ontogenies into larger-scale models for cultural transmission and evolution at the population 
level. They also predict that where learning ontogenies resemble biological conditions, cultural 
evolution should proceed similarly to biological evolution. Conversely, where learning 
ontogenies differ from biological conditions then cultural evolution will proceed down its own, 
unique, evolutionary pathway.  
Chapter 3  
 Approximately six to seven million years ago, the ancestors of what would become 
modern humans diverged from the ancestors of chimpanzees and bonobos (Stauffer, et al., 2001; 
Kumar, et al., 2005;Soares, et al., 2009; Langergraber, et al., 2012). While the exact cause of this 
divergence from the last common ancestor is not yet known, the six million or so years following 
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saw the rapid rise and extinction of a number of hominins until only a single species, Homo 
sapiens, remained (Lieberman, 2011; Wood, 2011; Stringer, 2012; Tattersall, 2012 ).  Over the 
course of this divergence a number of traits appeared that separated modern humans from 
chimpanzees and bonobos including  but not limited to, bipedalism (Spoor, Wood and 
Zonneveld, 1992; Lieberman, 2012; Haile-Selassie, et al., 2012), tool-enabled large carcass 
scavenging (McPherron, et al., 2010; Ferraro, et al., 2013), fire and cooking (Wrangham and 
Conklin-Brittain, 2003; Wrangham and Carmody, 2010), tool-enabled hunting (Stiner, et al., 
1999; Clark, 2011; Fa, et al., 2013),  language (Aiello and Dunbar, 1993; Corballis, 2009; 
Tattersall and Schwartz, 2009) and later, agriculture (Gignoux, Henn and Mountain, 2011; 
Walter and Ley, 2011; Henn, Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 2012)  and animal domestication 
(Diamond, 2002; Smith, 2007;  Vigne, 2011) 
Each of these topics is, of course, its own subject area within paleoanthropology, but 
there have been attempts to find an overall pattern which explains the evolutionary divergence 
and difference between humans and chimpanzees/bonobos. The most current understanding is 
that humans and the overall hominin lineage were general cognitive niche exploiters, investing in 
ever larger brains that in turn allowed for more efficient methods of resource gathering and 
environmental control (Barrett, 2007; Pinker, 2010; Stotz, 2010; Iriki and Taoka, 2011). Andrew 
Whiten and David Erdal, (Whiten and Erdal, 2012) have extended this model, arguing that 
humans are not just cognitive niche exploiters, but rather socio-cognitive exploiters. In addition 
to our investment in more cognitive power, humans evolved a “deep social mind” marked by 
several traits including: cooperation, egalitarianism, theory of mind, language and cumulative 
culture. In this socio-cognitive model, these traits act together in a positive feedback loop to 
reinforce the social nature of humans, thereby providing a fertile ground for the development of 
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cognitive abilities. Using Whiten and Erdal’s arguments, along with the previous findings of this 
thesis, in this chapter I will construct a general outline of human evolution.  
 First it is necessary to review social evolution at a more general level. While many 
animals live in social groups, only a few species exhibit social traits reaching the level of 
“eusociality,” where social groups possess distinct social and labor roles, overlapping 
generations and alloparental care of off-spring (Crespi and Yanga, 1995). The majority of known 
eusocial species are found in the bee, ant, termite, mole rat, and human lineages (Wilson, 2012).  
Unfortunately for the purposes here, most of the recent scholarship on eusociality has focused on 
the public debate regarding the exact evolutionary mechanisms that led to eusociality in these 
taxa, i.e. kin selection or group selection (Nowak, Tarnita and Wilson, 2010; Abott, et al., 2010; 
Strassmann, et al., 2011; Gardner, West and Wild, 2011; Dawkins, 2012; Pinker, et al., 2012; 
Wilson, 2012)  so there has been relatively less cross-species comparison performed to 
investigate the general environmental conditions that favor eusocial evolution. That being said, 
there are some general similarities in the niches of the eusocial animals that will serve as a good 
starting point for determining the biological conditions that likely gave rise to eusociality.  
First, and most importantly, the vast majority of the euoscial species are mutualists of 
some sort. Bees are mutualists with angiosperms, trading pollination for nectar. Ants are 
mutualists with trees, aphids or fungi (Beattie, 1985; Mueller, et al., 1998; Schultz and Brady, 
2008; Detrain, et al., 2010), while termites are, in a larger sense, mutualists with the biosphere – 
re-releasing carbon sequestered in cellulose for useful biochemical processes (Higashi, Abe and 
Burns, 1992). This mutualist dynamic can create an autocatalytic feedback cycle that 
significantly raises the ecological carrying capacity for a species.  When bees pollinate flowers, it 
leads to more flowers that in turn allows for more bees. By growing more fungi, ant queens can 
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give birth to more ants, which can grow more fungi. The mutualistic framework of these eusocial 
species avoids the boom and bust population dynamics of a predator-prey interaction (Gilpin, 
1973). Additionally, the eusocial species largely monopolize or have first-mover advantage for 
the available resource: ants are the only known fungi-agriculturists, termites were the first animal 
to efficiently break down cellulose
6
, and only bees can produce honey from nectar rather than 
immediately consuming it. Finally, eusocial species are all obligate socialists and cannot survive 
on their own as individuals. As a group, they have only limited recourse should their main 
energy store deplete. It should also be noted that the euosocial species that do not follow these 
outlined similarities to the letter often do so in spirit. For instance, the eusocial shrimp (Duffy, 
2002) are technically parasites of host sponges in that they consume the products of the sponge 
without providing any benefit, but there have been no observed negative effects to the sponge 
and thousands of shrimp can occupy a single sponge, giving the same relative effect of 
mutualism.  
These similarities in eusocial species become, in turn, tunable parameters in the 
transmission cost equation discussed in the previous chapter. They serve as a suggested 
minimum set of internal and external evolutionary forces that produce eusociality. If these 
conditions do lead to eusociality, then we would expect that fixing the required external values in 
the transmission cost equation and allowing infinite selection from the internal forces would 
eventually produce a eusocial social organization. In other words, for eusociality in humans to 
have evolved along similar conditions as other eusocial species, then in the historical 
transmission cost equation of humans there must be terms that resemble the above conditions. 
What I will argue from here is that the hallmarks of human evolution previously discussed and 
                                                 
6
 Why termites, but not ruminants, have developed eusocaility is an interesting question, and an unresolved research 
question. As a guess, I would suggest it has to do with the diminished energy returns in cellulose breakdown as a 
function of body-size.   
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the model provided by Whiten and Erdal give an equivalent set of conditions to those described 
for other eusocial taxa. Specifically, each hallmark of human evolution outlined previously, and 
the investment in increasing cognitive abilities, gradually reduced the environmental pressures 
on humanity that arise from the need for resource extraction and exploitation and made 
proceeding evolutionary innovations more likely. This, in turn, allowed selective pressures to act 
towards social optimization, leading to the positive feedback mechanisms recognized by Whiten 
and Erdal. Finally, this pathway led to a mutualist point of no return from which humans, as a 
species, cannot likely escape: agriculture and domestication.  
 To begin, bipedalism, tool-enabled carcass scavenging and hunting, fire and cooking all 
reduced environmental pressures on humans. Bipedalism gave humans longer range of sight and 
freed two appendages for environmental interaction and tool-use. Tool-enabled carcass 
scavenging and hunting, in turn, allowed efficient access to energy-dense meat, with fire and 
cooking increasing these nutritional benefits and reducing risk of food-borne disease (Lynt, et 
al., 1977;Bhaduri, et al., 1991; Sales, Marais, and Kruger, 1996; Chrstensen, Purslow and 
Larsen, 2000; Lombardi-Boccia, Lanzi and Aguzzi, 2005).  Undoubtedly, each of these 
innovations arose out of specific and contingent environmental conditions of evolution, but 
noticeably, each serves as a prerequisite for the next. Tool-enabled scavenging is not efficient 
without free hands, and cooking is unlikely to evolve without a steady supply of roastable 
material. What is more important is that, even though each innovation likely evolved from its 
own circumstances, once all three were in place they together acted as a singular unit to greatly 
increase the available metabolic energy.
7
 This available metabolic energy consequently allowed 
for a general investment in cognitive abilities via rapidly increasing brain-size (Lee and Wolpoff, 
                                                 
7
 I would also like to note that tool-enabled food acquisition of plant material likely played a critical role as well, in 
terms of both dietary energy and cognitive development, but the archaeological evidence for this is comparatively 
thin.  
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2003; Leonard, et al., 2003; Isler and van Schaik, 2009), and additionally, as a sort of 
tautological corollary, the efficiency of humans in acquiring energy resources in turn diminished 
the impact of evolutionary selection in these areas, freeing evolution to operate more strongly on 
social characteristics.  
This can be seen by comparing human abilities with those of chimpanzees or bonobos. 
Using Whiten’s and Erdal’s proposed relationship between language and theory of mind  as an 
example, it is certainly true that chimpanzees and bonobos both exhibit theory of mind and 
language abilities. Both are capable of recognizing conspecific intentions and knowledge and 
reacting accordingly (Boesch, 2002; Call and Tomasello, 2008; Palagi, 2008; Clay and de Waal, 
2013), and both show the ability for referential language (Gardner and Gardner, 1969; Savage-
Rumbaugh, 1986).  These abilities, however, are exhibited at a weaker level than in humans.  
Neither chimpanzees nor bonobos have shown the ability to distinguish false-beliefs (Call and 
Tomesello, 2008; Hare, 2011) and both chimpanzees and bonobos have exhibited referential 
language only in captivity, precisely where most environmental pressures have been alleviated. 
These intra-species deficiencies, then, are likely the result of some upper limit to chimpanzee and 
bonobo cognitive function in the wild, and in turn in vivo these species cannot develop the more 
intense social interactions seen in humans.  They simply have not yet met the minimum energy 
intake necessary to support the development and evolution of these capacities.   
Humans, having met this metabolic requirement, via bipedal hunting and cooking, were 
able to expand and engage in deep social interactions, which in turn allowed for the development 
of cumulative culture (i.e. the ratchet effect) which further catalyzed the process as argued by 
Whiten and Erdal.  Relatively freed from the necessities of energy acquisition, human evolution 
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could turn towards social optimization.
8
 Language, theory of mind, developing egalitarianism, 
and cooperation all contributed to a growing cumulative culture that further reduced the cost of 
energy acquisition. What can be seen from this is a gradual build-up of evolutionary variables 
and forces that begin to approximate the conditions of eusocial evolution in other species. The 
minimum metabolic requirement for large brains met by hunting and cooking paired with the 
positive social feedback loops explained by the Whiten and Erdal model closely resemble the 
autocatalytic cycles of the eusocial mutualists. Humans fell into an untapped energy niche, and 
developed more intense social organization and social-oriented cognitive function to better 
exploit that niche. At the species level, the peak of this development and the point of no return 
for humans came with the implementation of agriculture and animal domestication. The 
domestication of animals and grain granted us strong positive feedback loops in which the 
breeding and planting of agricultural products allowed for excess food, larger population, and in 
turn, more breeding and planting of agricultural products. These twin acts made humans true 
mutualists, and we are now dependent on mass agriculture and domesticated animals to provide 
the bulk of our food sources.  This can be dramatically seen in Figure 3.  
                                                 
8
 This general model also fits in very well with Marshall Sahlin’s arguments regarding hunter-gatherers in Stone Age 
Economics (1974); specifically, that hunter-gatherers spend relatively little time accruing the environmental 
resources necessary to sustain life. From this, we can deduce there is relatively little environmental pressure on their 
survival.  
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Figure 3. Earth’s Land Mammals by Weight (Munroe, 2014). 
 
The sorts of pressures causing evolution in humans before and after this eusocial turn can 
also help explain the rise of scale-free network topologies in human populations. Prior to the 
increased energy efficiency brought on by the suite of biological adaptions, the evolutionary 
pressures are mainly selective based an individuals’ abilities to acquire energy and avoid 
predation. After the energetic breakthrough, however, the evolutionary forces remaining are 
primarily stochastic environmental ones, operating more randomly on populations. This change 
in types of evolutionary forces likely explains the subsequent network developments in human 
populations.  
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 To briefly summarize, humans independently evolved bipedalism, tool-enabled 
scavenging and hunting, and cooking. The combination of these skills allowed for an increased 
metabolic intake that allowed for a rapid increase in brain size. These increased cognitive 
abilities, in turn, allowed for a strengthening of humans’ social-cognitive functions and the 
positive feedback loop of the socio-cognitive niche. The end result was the development of 
obligate mutualism in the form of agriculture and animal domestication. As such, humans have 
become classically evolved along eusocial lines.  
Conclusion  
 In this thesis I have laid out four main arguments: first, that culture is an actual entity 
existing as a bit-like structure at some minimum biophysical juncture, likely within neural code. 
Second, that these culture-bits are distributed across a social network of humans, which exists as 
a storehouse for the culture-bits. Third, that evolution in this culture-bit network can be 
explained by a set of partial differential equations that relate the evolutionary forces to the 
culture-bit frequencies. Finally, that the pathway of human of evolution can be better understood 
by using general similarities in eusocial animals to derive the likely terms in humans’ past 
transmission cost equations. My construction of these cumulatively building arguments is quite 
deliberate so that it is entirely possible for one to accept the arguments up to a point but no 
further. I will be sufficiently happy if one can only agree with the first two points, for instance, 
but find the second two unconvincing at this time. As I said in the introduction, the work of the 
thesis is almost entirely theoretical and much more research will be needed to completely 
validate each argument.  
  There are several areas, in particular, that would benefit from further study. At some 
point, the exact biocultural juncture that leads to culture-bits will need to be located. While I 
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have proposed a one-to-one correlation between neuronal firing pattern and resulting culture-bits, 
I fully recognize that a similar proposal regarding the genetic code (Crick, 1970) has been found 
wanting, as mounting evidence shows the flow of information in biology is not a simple 
unidirectional one (Ahlquist, 2002; Ball, 2013). Additionally, understanding how these culture-
bits are actually distributed and flow through networks will be critical. While culture-bits exist as 
individual entities, it is likely they are transmitted and understood in packets.  It seems apparent 
that when we learn we do not learn just a single solitary item, but a collection of related facts or 
skills. Learning the shapes of these packets and if they are similar in content density is critical to 
developing good models of cultural transmission and evolution.  
 If there is a major deficiency in this thesis, at least for practitioners and field empiricists, 
it is that the task I have set forth in the transmission cost equations is likely impossible. As a 
practical matter, one simply cannot capture or determine the strength of every force of evolution. 
Even if one could, partial differential equations are notoriously difficult to solve, and an exact 
solution to a set of equations that numbers in millions with an equal number of variables is 
simply not possible unless there are major breakthroughs in computational power. This, 
however, does not imply that the proposed equations are not accurately describing the events 
happening. We cannot yet solve similar equations describing water turbulence (Fefferman, 
2000), yet Victoria Falls continues to flow into the Zambezi. Unfortunately, at least for our 
understanding, the universe seems quite capable of solving these equations in real time without 
recourse to a calculator.  Nevertheless, posing the problem exactly, regardless of our ability to 
answer it, can lead to new insights and a portion of the equation might be solved to yield critical 
insights (Zakharov and Shabat, 1972).   
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 To briefly conclude, what I have attempted over the course of the thesis is to construct a 
framework for understanding anthropological topics that is consistent with the larger modes of 
thought and analyses being conducted in other scientific fields. Ultimately, it is my belief that 
anthropology, particularly cultural anthropology, will have to wrestle deeply with the findings 
and understandings generated in the sciences and this thesis is a first attempt at that. Unlike 
Leslie White in the 1940’s, as anthropologists we can no longer lay claim to epistemological or 
methodological superiority and rely on field-insular findings to advance our understanding of 
human nature. Instead our ideas must rise, or fall, in accordance with our larger understandings 
of the universe.   
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